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	<title>Comments on: DNS Updates &#8211; The cat, a now empty bag, and poison</title>
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		<title>By: Mark Adams</title>
		<link>http://ddos.arbornetworks.com/2008/07/dns-updates-the-cat-a-now-empty-bag-and-poison/comment-page-1/#comment-148189</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark Adams</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 27 Jul 2008 16:45:02 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I really thought that this was going to be an exploit that targeted non-public recursive nameservers as well. Tom Ptacek had suggested that perhaps cross site scripting combined with a typical poison attack was making even private nameservers susceptible to controlled queries by the attacker. I thought I&#039;d read that this would even affect private recursive caching nameservers behind firewalls.

That doesn&#039;t appear to be the case. The exploit posted still requires queries sent directly to the nameserver, and although this is frightening because so many blindly use public DNS nameservers, it&#039;s not going to affect those who were already smart enough not to blindly trust some anonymous third party&#039;s idea of DNS. It&#039;s always been a fundamental security practice not to use DNS servers that you don&#039;t trust. Unfortunately most Internet users simply use their ISPs nameservers, even though no privacy policy is provided and no security even hinted at. This is why my brother and I started ifirefly.com earlier this year.

I&#039;m still hoping that more information is released at Black Hat that we haven&#039;t seen. Otherwise, like you said, it&#039;s an interesting new attack methodology, but it&#039;s not a new vulnerability, or a bug that Kaminski found.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I really thought that this was going to be an exploit that targeted non-public recursive nameservers as well. Tom Ptacek had suggested that perhaps cross site scripting combined with a typical poison attack was making even private nameservers susceptible to controlled queries by the attacker. I thought I&#8217;d read that this would even affect private recursive caching nameservers behind firewalls.</p>
<p>That doesn&#8217;t appear to be the case. The exploit posted still requires queries sent directly to the nameserver, and although this is frightening because so many blindly use public DNS nameservers, it&#8217;s not going to affect those who were already smart enough not to blindly trust some anonymous third party&#8217;s idea of DNS. It&#8217;s always been a fundamental security practice not to use DNS servers that you don&#8217;t trust. Unfortunately most Internet users simply use their ISPs nameservers, even though no privacy policy is provided and no security even hinted at. This is why my brother and I started ifirefly.com earlier this year.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m still hoping that more information is released at Black Hat that we haven&#8217;t seen. Otherwise, like you said, it&#8217;s an interesting new attack methodology, but it&#8217;s not a new vulnerability, or a bug that Kaminski found.</p>
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